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The wheel-like figure in the design above is an
ancient sun symbol. It can signify any source of illumination, for the simplest light contains potencies of
the subtlest and highest. Below the sun is a stylized
rendering of a certain bridge over an alpine gorge.
For this publication the bridge represents the nexus
between the sciences and the humanities. But it can
also stand for efforts which man makes to reconcile
the opposites that confront him. With any light that
he can find, he seeks to fuse conflicting yet complementary forces for shaping the unruly or inert
materials available to his creativity.
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THE RESPONSIBLE EXERCISE OF
CREATIVE POWER
by
CARL TON CULMSEE
ONCE last summer we stood. near the snow-white cascade
flowing over the world's largest concrete dam, Grand
Coulee, which is twice as high as Niagara Falls. We were
alone in the gallery with the shafts that link the turbines
to the dynamos. The nearest shaft appeared to be a pillar
strong enough to bear half the burdens of humanity. It
seemed to stand still and serene. Examined more closely, it revealed itself
as spinning with perfect smoothness. For all we could see, we were alone
in the eleven miles of passages inside the dam and powerhouse, alone with
a cosmic hum and the whirling of eighteen shafts, each capable of conveying
160,000 horsepower. Those shafts, a classic colonnade of might spinning in
a wide spotless emptiness, could have been regarded as symbols of a machine
civilization which had rendered man obsolete. But this would have been
a weak and mistaken view. There were technicians watching control panels
night and day to keep the enormous mechanism running harmoniously,
supplying rivers of electricity t o factories and stores, farms and homes over
a wide area. The shafts were pillars sustaining a huge and intricate economy.
They were instruments of man's will under perfect human control.
The Grand Coulee project symbolizes man's power to weave the ragged
fibers, the sprawling vines of nature into a compact cable of great length
and strength. Who can estimate the number of turbulent, undisciplined
little and large forces thus knit together - wind-driven clouds freighted
with moisture by the sun over Bering Sea; rivulets creeping out of glaciers,
springs, and tarns in a dozen ranges, rivers awesome in flood., all gathered
into Roosevelt Lake behind the dam, tamed to irrigate, illuminate, and
empower an empire? The dam is proof of how trickles and freshets of human
energy, mental, spiritual, physical, flowing out of philosophers, scientists,
engineers, laborers of past and present, statesmen and secretaries and
bureaucrats, have all united in a river of tremendous might; that river
transmuted into a torrent of fire, and that torrent, in the firm grasp of men,
channeled through thousands of arteries and capillaries to serve farmers,
housewives, bankers, manufacturers, toilers of a wide region; and all this
alchemy - majestic power out of chaos, divine fire out of roily, brawling
waters - all this from the vision of men who, individually and unweaponed,
could not stem a creek.
In this essay I will make free with earth and sun, nature and human
nature, geological history and evolutionary process, in ways that only a
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great poet or seer should attempt; and alas, I have grounds for suspecting
that I am neither. So this paper could be presumption exhibited on a
scale by a small mind. But I hope for your indulgence as I beckon to
shoulder the wise men and women, alive and dead, who have aided
This essay may be no intellectual Grand Coulee project capable of .",.,.. u ........
millions of candles. But brooks and rivers of mental force available to
have been as numerous as the physical streams which flow into Koose:veJ,tI
Lake; and if I generate only enough horsepower to turn a scissor-grinder
do have some gems of clippings, at least), the fault is mine, not that of
shadowy legion who strove to help me as I wrote.

•

•

•

You shall wait no longer to learn of an assumption
undergirds my effort. It is this: the two cultures
divide our world, the scientific and the humanistic,
again ,become cooperative as they often were until
times, if we are to benefit from anything approaching
full and direct expression of our creative potential.
Charles P. Snow, I believe that this reunion is necessary, perhaps for
petuation of our species.
Another assumption of mine is more speculative. It is that long ago .
something like a void, there were TWO. Two what? Two powers, let
say: one a restless energy, the other an urge to impose shape on things,
compulsion to bring order out of disorder. The Two, unruly energy
the imperious drive to give form, were complementary; wedded in
ofttimes fretful union, they constituted the Creative Power. Despite
sional irascibility toward each other, they were essential to each other,
concavity and convexity are compatibly contrasted in a water pipe, a
glass, a chalice.
That void where the Two fused should not be visualized as <;LUIJUIU<;;o,.
with the Creative Power emerging from nothing to snatch building lll~~lCJ(llU.
out of thin air or no air at all. In one branch of Far Eastern thought,
Void is not a vacuum but a condition of spiritual freedom. For our purp<>Sd.
let us call the Void freedom to create. The scriptural phrase "without
and void" suggests part of what I mean; materials were there, and in
previous spheres of development they may have attained more or less
plexity. But as far as the new synthesis was concerned, they were devoid
form, they were chaos and raw material. Just as a stone may have ·nrr,,..,r_
crystalline and atomic structures, yet be only a building block to the
tect of a new edifice, just as data ascertained by some lab assistant may
raw material for a mind capable of synthesizing on a large scale; the
and Yin or the Adam and Eve of the new creation found building
in the void, particles or intensities or complexes of such units, perhaps
evolved for a former purpose but raw material for the new forms now
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brought to birth. And let us ,theorize further, that this union of the energetic Dionysian experimentalist and the Apollonian enforcer of order, a
merger which we can call the Creative Power, has given us all the diversity
we see, not only of forms of crystals in minerals and snowstorms but other
forms in viruses, bacteria, and more complex organisms, everything that
swims and stalks, wriggles, and flies.
We must, I believe, see this Creative Power manifested in everything,
inanimate as well as animate, in stones, in animals, in men and societies.
In the laboratory, it is the reconciliation of the imaginative with the prudent,
the one raising questions, devising expedients, plunging into space with
speculations, the other obdurately demanding verification. In literature, art
and philosophy it is the fusion in a period or in a mind, or in successive
periods, of the romantic and the classic, the one being luxuriant in imagination and freedom of inventiveness, with an energy so ebullient that it might
boil up sometimes in frenzy, the other requiring order and form for balance
and stability.
I hope I have not unintentionally insinuated the idea of a parallel
between the form-giver and science on the one hand, between energy and
emotional excesses in the arts on the other. Both sciences and arts are actuated
by the same creative principle, including the imaginative and experimental merged with the need for discipline of thought and verification
of theory.

•

•

•

WHY do we observe a division, often an antagonism, certainly a lack of satisfactory communication between the
two cultures, the scientific-technical and the literary-artistic? One reason usually mentioned is specialization, which
causes practitioners in the two camps to speak distinct
languages, with different vocabularies or different meanings attached to the same words. But this difficulty, though real, is not
fundamentally divisive; the same barrier separates some sciences from others,
some arts from others. Rapport of a non-verbal but mutually helpful kind
can be consummated between, say, a Chinese and an American, even when
each knows litde of the other's tongue. If they are men of good will
unwarped by ethnic or religious prejudice, they can communicate to some
extent by signs, gestures, pictures, sometimes expressing meanings beyond
~ords. A more important cleavage develops out of our lazy habit of overslmp~fication, which like other sorts of indolence is a prolific breeder,
espeCIally of error. Emotionality usually abets over-simplification. A painter
~nd a 1?hysicist, for example, can be neighbors, hiking and fishing together,
eepe.rung mutual respect and communicating on some levels with ease,
agre~l~g and disagreeing to about the same extent as two artists will, or two
phYSICIStS. That is, they can do so until something inflames professional pride
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and prejudice on one side, to strike sparks on both; then a barbed wire
entanglement rises and the communication road breaks into a "field of
honor." Some humanists like and respect individual scientists; but the word
Science with a capital "s" arouses in them envy or defiance or the desire to
reprove and amend, as though science were a homogeneous fraternity, or a
church requiring its members to swear allegiance to the same articles of
faith. This is a most unscientific illusion which many writers and
nournish. I have found, however, that some scientists and engineers
alize JUSt as fallaciously about humanists - and about themselves!
Samuel S. Kistler, dean of the College of Engineering, University of
not long ago published an article in the college magazine Utechnic (1962)
reflecting a generalization which some members of each culture entertain:
that "we" are bound together in brotherhood by common standards
ideals and by perspicuity of thought and precision of language. Such ~LLLUII-''''
tions are silvered o'er with a brittle moon-magic which cannot endure
scrutiny. Scientists and engineers tend, I have observed, to disagree as
cultures themselves, and in each of these two the members divide
factions. They can, provided they wish earnestly enough, meet on cOlnnlorll
ground and communicate with precision if they confine themselves to ..
areas and largely to mathematical symbols. Beyond that they can fall
semantic bramble patches similar to those which lie between the arts
the sciences. That the scientist is trained to convey only one infallibly
meaning with his words, regardless of how far afield from his specialty
roams, is another belief which has been expressed to me by scientists
which will not bear analysis. It is akin to the illusion that the cold,
passionate, logical reason implied by the scientific method fcHows a sClC·~ntlSl
(physical, biological, and now social) inevitably, even when he walks
his own province into that of someone else. It is related to the illusion
scientists cannot have illusions.
Dean Kistler also deprecated the contempt which, he wrote, UUU'"'U"''"W
direct at scientists and engineers. Recently Dr. J. Robert
( 1961) likewise bemoaned the "contemptuous" attitude of "so many"
the natural and mathematical sciences. This sensitiveness of some ~1t:lll"3 • •
and engineers to the relatively few criticisms voiced against them by humant
ists astonishes me. Scientists and engineers occupy well-nigh
positions in popular respect, and their feeling of superiority waxes
generation.. As Charles P. Snow (1959), whose education has been
scientific, wrote, "the young scientists now feel that they are part of a
on the rise while the other is in retreat. It is also, to be brutal, that
young scientists know that with an indifferent degree, they'll get a cornt01rt.
able job, while their contemporaries and counterparts in English or
will be lucky to earn 60 percent as much. No young scientist of any
would feel that he isn't wanted or tha:t his work is ridiculous ..." The
implication of this statement by a man originally a scientist is that
people in the humanities are often made to feel that they are unwanted
that their work is ridiculous. As a dean of arts and sciences for 17 years,
LJI............
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found this attitude certainly not universal among scientists, engineers, and
technicians, but much more prevalent than any scorn which the humanists
might feel toward them. No reasonably well-furnished, well-balanced mind
is, I believe, genuinely contemptuous of the natural and mathematical sciences
and engineering today. As a matter of fact, the opposite is proved by the
respect verging on subservience which many in art, literature, and social
sciences express toward natural science in words or by endeavoring to adapt
its successful methods to their uses and even to guide themselves by speculative implications of its discoveries. Rather, if complaint is aimed at natural
science by a humanist, it is the despairing wail uttered as the last wave of
the scientific-technical-industrial culture rolls over him. Or it is the grumble
of those who grace in captive chains the chariot wheels of conqueror Science
- to the embarrassment, I must admit, of most scientists. I do not know
what more Dean Kistler and Dr. Oppenheimer could ask than the trust
and respect verging on adulation with which the natural and mathematical
sciences, engineering, and technology are generally regarded .

•

rs,

•

•

ON THE other hand, as I noted, there are many evidences
that persons in the sciences and engineering view much
modern literature and art with distaste or frustration. What
is more, I feel that they are frequently justified. The reason may be this: most natural scientists, mathematicians,
and engineers conduct themselves as though they believe
fully in the worth of existence and of what they are doing. They reflect
that profound faith in the goodness or improvability of life and the need
of expressing the creative principle which runs through all nature and
through humanity itself. They cannot understand the soul sickness or world
weariness infecting much of the contemporary art, music, and literature most
highly regarded by some pontifical critics. They find the pessimistic
existentialist and his views about the absurdity of life the height of the
absurd. They cannot understand the acclaim with which much "quality"
writing and modern painting and sculpture is received in some quarters.
They are usually dumbfounded at the isolation or alienation from society
~nd. ~he universe felt by many existentialist writers and artists. They are
JustIfrably puzzled at the immense effort, the millions of words and acres
of canvas lavished to illustrate how useless human effort is and how meaningless life is, at the multiplicity of creations which must surely have a
depressing effect on the creative drive of readers or viewers. With faith in
scientific methods, technical processes, and human energy to solve our probl~ms, they cannot comprehend the gloomy preoccupation of some of our
~lter~ virtuosos with, for example, that hardy perennial, innate, and
InexplIcable evil.
Innate evil, seen not as a mere component of life but as the dominant
element, comes back ever and again to haunt us. Probably it reappears
-7-

more formidably now since twO world wars, since Auschwitz and Buchenwald, and the Sralinist massacres of Ukrainian farmers. Treatments of it
yield evidence of the malady which afflicts many of our "serious" writers
and proponents of the most discussed philosophy of our time. A recent
voluminous exemplification of the theme that life is meaningless agony
and mysterious evil, that the stream of creative energy flows to bad ends or
loses itself in a wasteland, is Katherine Anne Porter's Ship of Fools (1962).
The novel describes the sailing of a German liner from Veracruz, Mexico,
with a diverse but predominately offensive or miserable list of passengers.
The Vera, a second-rate ship, is an elaborate figure to illustrate a belief that
this space vessel of ours is an undistinguished planet showing the effects
batterings which occurred before we appeared on board. It has a t1v"np'htllr
arbitrary captain who lords it like a god and judge over the human
entrusted to him. Everyone, repeat, everyone is lonely, heartsick,
frustrated, or inexplicably bad. The malignity is incarnate most
in a troupe of Spanish dancers who are gifted, magnetic, irr,·nr,..,,,i
vital, and thoroughly evil. This malign spirit is not relieved by any I-'L"u..u~"II
of hegelian alternation, evil out of good, good out of evil. The women
prostitutes, the men pimps, the children imps without a redeeming tenLdellCY.•
They not only pervert the reproductive impulses but would turn ~ ... ,.,,~.u,,'...
into murder for money. Because hundreds of people, who are pitted "5'UU3'.
each other by bitter religious, nationalistic, and other prejudices, are
into artificial intimacy (in a simulation of the future effects of our I-'VIJlll""
tion explosion), damage of many kinds is done to human dignity and
bilities. The gentle Professor Hutten who from his ivory tower of LVl....ll. ." .
philosophy had viewed human nature as naturally good, has so many
dences of perversity and malice, gratuitous, unprovoked, injurious ...lM..LUo;,'II
forced upon him that he is ultimately compelled to conclude, "There is
a thing as incurable love of evil." Dr. Schumann, ship's physician,
intelligence and high character make him the most admirable of those
the Vera, comes also to his hour of truth: "His agitation grew as he
the oppression of the increasing millions of subhuman beings, the u,,·.uu .... ~,. .
grave-stuff not even fit to be good servants, yet whose mere mass and
of negative evil threatened to rule the world." When the dingy
makes port in the symbolic doldrums of a world-wide shipping strike,
passengers and crew flee the vessel without a friendship formed, with
relief and hopes of happiness which are illusory. For the future they
is Hitler's Germany with its frenzy of hatreds falling to the slaughter
and the wholesale tragedy of war.
What I would underscore is the disease which afflicts many of
potentially best artists and writers, virtuosos of technique, to the Uo.JL"'f""'~.
ing of our creative ardor. There is no doubt that most of our highly
painters and writers expose symptoms of grave illness of mind and
which must tend to poison or misdirect the creative impulse in them
those influenced by them. Recently in Saturday Review David Boroff (1962
accurately characterized the contemporary literary mind as being
- 8-
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upon nihilism and disorder. Using novels of Isaac Bashevic Singer for
illustration, he declared that the novelist's preoccupation with "the demonic,
the nocturnal, the rampageously evil" was the quality which "endeared him
to the contemporary literary mind." The marks of most "serious" or "quality" fiction today are futilitarianism and meaninglessness, with accent on a
ghasdy absurdity rather than on the wonder of life. The chief hope one
can find in some of the most artistic works of our modern "moralists" esoteric critics seem to equate abhorrence of human nature with moral
purpose - is seen in the effort to grope into a new mythos, a sort of "return
to religion" in rejection of materialism and the mechanistic determinism
long characteristic of the English and American novd. But often this
"return" is a decline toward diabolism: in a new monotheism, the phoenix
rising from the ashes of the old supernaturalism, God is malign and therefore requires the old morality to be turned inside out. At this juncture
I comply with the informal commitment made in my original proposal
to the Lecture Committee. I suggested that I deal with diabolism as a
perverse expression of ·the religious impulse. All of us, I believe, seek
harmony with the Supreme Power or the natural forces in the universe,
to devdop oursdves individually or to improve society, to seek the ideal
design of life. This may be a way to characterize the directive urge in the
core of things. In polytheism, diabolism could be merely efforts to
propitiate an evil spirit who is the black sheep in a household of gods.
In our culture, however, diabolism tends to spring from a belief that the
dominant power is inimical to man, or from a conviction that our traditional ideals conflict with the universal design. Diabolism becomes a religion
of despair, because a person can scarcely visualize the supreme authority,
whether a personal God or a code of natural laws, as hostile to him without
undergOing a devastating spiritual upheaval. Actions impelled by diabolism
are therefore expressions of the Creative Power, but expressions which are
negative or destructive except as they unintentionally prepare for future
building by wrecking and burning. In latter-day diabolism, evil becomes
virtue and virtue evil; worship is conducted at a shrine where, in Swinburne's phrase, "a sin is a prayer." Sebastian, in Tennessee Williams' play,
Suddenly Last Summer, had believed he had seen the "face of God" in the
cloud of predatory birds that swoop down to disembowel millions of newly
hatched turtles in useless slaughter. Sebastian had worshipped the demonic
God, it is suggested, through degenerate rituals and finally had offered his
body ~p as a sacrifice to teenage cannibals who had been steeped in a new
paganism of moral inversion and hopelessness.
Quite obviously much of the art and literature often ranked at the top
of the scale today is not aimed at furthering man's evolutionary advance by
Str~ngthening and directing his creative impulses. Too often the fiction
:!1~er Or artist expects to be praised simply because he creates, not because
e IS. ~ truly responsible or positive creator. Admittedly our generation of
tran~ltJon finds it difficult to judge the ultimate value of revolutionary
Wor s. But beyond giving credit for emotional intensity, sincerity and origi-9-

nality in developing themes which have been treated little in the past, we can
hardly find lasting value in such novels as James Baldwin's Another Country
or believe that they foster the creative flow except perhaps negatively by
exposing abuses and hastening reaction in books with more positive vitality
in them. To be responsible in a large, wise way a writer or artist must be
more than a channel of lyric despondency which disparages the tenacious
continuity of the species and its constructive manifestations.

•

•

•

I HAVB told why I think science and engineering often
trust the arts and as often fail to derive values which
should gain from them, from products of older UWluallUM:l~.
traditions if not from those of our time. Now I
to descr1be deficiences of science which seem to
creativity. I would mention reasons why humanists
that science has blind spots which scarcely help qualify it for leadership
all branches of thought. Probably therefore I shall place myself in the
tion of one who in former times criticized a benevolent monarch;
ruler, more in grief than anger, showed his displeasure sufficiently to
loyal subjects to ostracize the ingrate. In more than one sense I shall reSemll>l~.
one who in olden times had the foolhardiness to break a lance against
dominant church. Nevertheless, at peril of clogging the
channels which I would fain clear between you and me, I venture this
ment: scientific man is still subject to human fallibility despite
progress in certain directions, is indeed more subject to certain errors ""'-<111_
of confidence engendered by his long list of triumphs. Some scientists 'JeIICV._
themselves armored against human frailties by scientific ideals, the "'-"<OIlL,"".
method, the canons of scientific objectivity and logic. Some believe
when they rejected romantic illusion and religious superstition, they left
hind all illusion and superstition, even the possibility of harboring old,
generalizations and of erecting new illusions. They believe, to repeat a
vious assertion, that accuracy and objectivity, immunity to fantasy
passion, follow them automatically into any lane where they may
no matter how foreign it may be to their specialty.
I acknowledge the hazards I face at this point, more probably
the lay mind than from the scientific, for science is widely revered as
modern prophet, seer, and revelator, healer of mind and body for society
well as the individual, actual or potential solver of world problems, and
mate successor to outworn superstition-ridden creeds and baseless
physics. I am not thinking of mere wild fancies which the ignorant
entertain toward science. For example, in my youth I sa:w a lady pour
coffee cup overfull but the skin tension permitted the liquid to mound
slightly. Flushed with her little unexpected triumph, she uttered a
disclaimer, "Oh, that isn't much - a scientist could make ,i t stand up
-10 -

LO

ry
>y

ty
)f

us

inch higher at least!" This prunltlve hero-worship of you contemporary
witch doctors and miracle workers is a heady brew. How can you swallow
it - and hold to your humility? However, I am thinking more of the
scientist's own conception of himself.
One can note, as I hinted earlier, an illusion which seems fairly common among younger scientists, at least in their relations with other groups.
It is that scientists are a more or less homogeneous body of truth-seekers and
that science is a reasonably continuous fabric of truth; not merely fact on
a certain plane but truth in its fullness, a new plenary dispensation. This is,
surely, what the best scientists aspire to but know that they have seldom
attained. The word "truth" is often used loosely; we should distinguish between a verifiable datum and a rather comprehensive view of reality
which has required the interpretation of many data, perhaps from several
branches of science and even other subjects. When a scientist emerges from
a stimulating AAAS session, particularly if he has read a successful paper,
and he passes through an aisle of gaping laymen, he must have a proud
feeling of the power and unity of his profession. But I scarcely need ask,
what ,is that profession? And less need to answer; but I will: science includes
hundreds of branches in various stages of evolution; it is a tapestry being
woven in many fragments out of the most diverse human and natural materials. Indeed, while some weave, others are engaged in unravelling and shredding parts of what has been woven. Thus far science's successes have been
more in the stage of analysis than in the maturer stage of synthesis. Science
is being made by men and women of many nations and tongues with mingled
assistance, distortion, and pollution from powerful indiv,iduals, lay groups,
governments. Recall, for example, Lysenkoism. Thus, despite conscientious
efforts to protect its probity and accuracy, it is subject to human frailty and
limitations. It aspires to super-human clarity of sight and objectivity; but
even the "sophisticated" instruments with which we seek to extend its range
and safeguard its reliability are human creations and ultimately depend upon
a human observer with a point of view and with preoccupations which always
exist in a mind. That very first step, the choice of III subject for investigation,
is subjective; and the subjective enters all along the way. That is why Einstein inserted a factor to represent the observer in some of his equations.
To see science as a monolith of seamless and stainless steel requires an unquestioning faith of which only a starry-eyed innocent should be capable.
. You and I know this to be true: there are scientists of vision toiling
SIde by side with obtuse grubbers, inspired but erratic guessers - and ferrets
of mere data, diligent men who produce much with modest expenditures and others who possess ratholes that engulf thousands of dollars with no visible result, men who rush into publication with meager findings - and others
Who, after years of probing the bosom of nature, refuse to betray her secrets
~ven thOUgh subjected to cruel and unusual pressures by research directors.
b am often astonished, therefore, at the total achievement of you scientists;
Ut on. the other hand I see the unevenness, gaps, contradictions, and frequent lOability to interpret or synthesize results. We cannot blame science
-11-

for these apparent deficiencies, for science is young and the natural materials seem to be inexhaustible in possibilities and perplexities. But we cannot
see science as unified by anything but earnest, honest aspiration, laudable
efforts at self-discipline, and a humanity it shares with all others .

•

•

•

I HOPE I have not offended my friends by this harangue.
I have deep respect for such men as Datus Hammond and
Eldon Gardner, Stewart Williams and John Wood, both
as scholars and as gendemen. I cannot name all the good
scientists who have been understanding and helpful to
despite my naivete' and incapacities. I admire such engineers as Dean Peterson and Oayton Oark. With C. P. Snow I hold that
the future is in the bones of such as these, and, I should add, in the
of all those who swim sturdily in the profound tide of onward-moving
and creativity. In my present mood I feel a special warmth toward s,tP,..,,, .....
and Oyde Hardy and Don Olsen for preserving a straight face 'WrIPnpVI'r.
I mention my modest BS in geology to mask my feeling of inadequacy
the presence of distinguished scientists. And it would be folly beyond
rare gift for folly to suggest that I am not grateful for all the JU1UWlnu,,,' _
which science has given us, for all the wonders it has revealed, all the
comfortable, saving, curing, constructive things it has made possible.
aggregate accomplishment of the sciences, with their allies in
and technology, has been one of indescribable variety and magnitude.
out of a desire to conquer but simply to see clearly, penetrate natural
teries, answer questions and solve problems, science has vanquished all
It has rolled over the world with the irresistibility of a new deluge, as Ll"/U.~
a vast fissure had rent the cordilleras and emitted a flow of lava which
covered the earth.
This conquest is almost as marked in literature and philosophy as
the popular mind. You can recall evidences. Emile Zola, the French
influenced by biologist Claude Bernard, for example, formally surrender~
the novel to science in the latter 19th century. In his book The lix,oe1'vmem_
Novel he averred that henceforth novels would not be mere fictive art
case histories exemplifying how inheritance and environment determine
"The stones of the roadway and the brain of man are," he asserted,
to the same rules." And a bit later an American novelist and critic,
Dean Howells, proclaimed that the novel must be "veritistic," that is, must
true to objective fact; and since life is dull, the novel must not be
but dull, too. The philosophy of mechanistic determinism which seemed
rise ineluctably from 19th century science influenced many in the arts.
ers as different as Mark Twain and Theodore Dreiser wrote essays ~~, _ __
that men are simple machines driven by chemic compulsion. The de,hwlDaruz.
don of some contemporary art, with man ridiculed or rigorously excluded,
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probably, in part, a positive response to inhuman objectivity and, in part, a
savage revulsion against the shattering impacts of the scientific-technologicalindustrial civilization upon the spirtual and aesthetic sides of man. The
dominant religion on both sides of the Iron Curtain is, I am convinced, the
religion of physical humanitarianism, with science as its prophet. August
Comte actually strove to make science itself the contemporary religion with
solemn rituals and ceremonies. Thomas Paine and men both earlier and
later declared that scientific research brought us the authentic revelations
of God's will or nature's design; you may choose your own phrase. This creed
may not include a personal God or anything supernatural in the way of a
supreme being or of personal immortality. But it is an authentic religion
or substitute therefore in being a quest for an ideal design of life, it looks
forward to a heaven on earth rather than beyond the clouds, and it has in
science prophets and seers of what is conceived to be universal law.
Although the new physics and its indeterminacy have, I am informed,
dealt blows to the image of deity which the Deists and some later thinkers
formed, much of modern philosophy is deeply affected or ruled by natural
science and speculations drawn from it. This is to some degree as it should
be: philosophy must assimilate valid new knowledge. On the other hand,
those who should lead in fitting together the fragments yielded by scientific
specialties should not fall into subservience to those specialties, to become
mere choreboys of empirical scientists, each of whom is intent upon his own
slice of nature. One can, nevertheless, see many evidences that empirical procedures, recommended to us by their fruitfulness and their promise of mental
security through laboratory verification, have extended their influence upon
thought in areas which do not lend themselves to laboratory treatment. For
example, a young man earning his PhD in philosophy wrote me that he
could not seriously consider portions of a certain philosopher's work because
they could not be verified empirically. Reading that, I was reminded of my
first year here when I served as a member of the committee for a graduate
student in agricultural economics. The student had, like many others in the
social sciences, sought to give his research "respectability" by employing
scientific and statistical devices. He had carried out his calculations of the
v:u-ious factors studied to several decimal places. But when I asked in the
fl~ oral why he had not included the analysis of a certain factor, he explamed thus: he and his advisers had decided that, since the factor did not
lend itself to scientific analysis, being elusive and difficult or impossible to
measure, they would exclude it from the study. I am troubled by exclusion
of factors which are known to exist but are treated as though they did not.
.. . The well-known logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach has declared that
Philosophy is no longer the story of men who attempted in vain to 'say the
~ya~le' in pictures or verbose constructions of pseudo-logical form . ...
~re IS nothing unsayable to which it (the philosophy of science) must
';£~tuate." These sentences appear in his book The Rise of a Scientific
f b?:OPh y (1956). Meaning, in his view, depends wholly upon verila ility, not upon a concept of knowledge transcending observable things
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and employing other sources than sense perception. Now please do not
misunderstand: I am not objecting to verification and any means of purifying
the stream of fact. What is obvious, however, is that by demanding natural
science laboratory criteria for verification, we necessarily exclude those
aspects or factors which cannot be dealt with by such means. And we place
philosophy and art in thorough subjection to the laboratory and its apparatus.
If this is good, it is only partly good; the rest is falsehood and self-deception.
In political science and international relations also the nuclear physicist
and the physical chemist have, in the popular mind, the qualifications to be
arbiters plenipotentiary, moral leaders, and philosophers. Linus Pauling and
Edward Teller, on opposite sides, engaged frankly in campaigns which involve more than scientific knowledge and theory and have a higher temperature than the scientific method prescribes; they take up political, lega~
moral, and military cudgels. When Dr. Pauling appeared here he was engaged
in a crusade under the banner of the Friends Church, and he employed
the debating weapons of a passionate crusader.
Leo Szilard, who is, I understand, as earnest and admirable a person as
one could wish to meet, illustrates the manner in which the natural ~rl,pnl·l~r .
feels compelled to assume center stage in world politics. You will recall
Szilard as the physicist who drafted the memorandum which
President Roosevelt that the atom bomb was a scientific feasibility.
Dr. Szilard feels it his responsibility-possibly he feels an unwarranted
of guilt-to lobby long and hard for adoption of certain peace policies.
hopes to enlist at least ten percent of American voters in a campaign
effectuate these policies. Note how the impressive collective achievement
the natural sciences has persuaded him that leaders in those sciences posseSSll
the secrets of success in that most exacting complex, involving all hrolnrhM.
of learning, which is international relations. He declares modestly that
is seeking "a market for wisdom." The political principles which are
objects of his nationwide lobby he has already laid down in broad UUI'UU. . . .
but they are to be formulated into a detailed program by a council of
to twelve distinguished scientists which, he suggests, might be called
Council for Abolishing War." In formal declarations to heads of ~V·.<;;'UU1"U'_
Dr. Pauling has undertaken to represent not only Science but the race
man, when he protests against nuclear testing. Because no one can
to the humane objects of peace and world salvation, he has a most UI~ial.I. lU<"
manner of enlisting all mankind in one procession, placing himself at
head and leading it down a street which is not named Science. In a
modest man this would appear arrogant. It might even be termed me:giIJ".
mania by the unsympathetic. But so far as I am aware, the yearning
sumptions of such scientists as Szilard and Pauling have not been \-llllUC;U.!!,, , ,
or deemed ' over-weening by many persons of importance. I recall
familiar facts not, i hope, in envy, but perhaps to illustrate human HUU""',.
in top-flight minds. The wide acceptance of their non-science convictions
laymen illustrates the faith which many have transferred from religion
physical science. A temptation most difficult to resist in the one to
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the crown of benevolent philosopher-king and save mankind from itself or
insidious enemies by superior wisdom, especially when "the public" demands
the coronation. It seems unscientific of Szilard, Teller, Pauling, et al. to
permit the incense of public adulation to cause this intoxication which often
makes them respond authoritatively to questions of sociology, psychology,
morals, abstract justice, international politics, military strategy, and occasionally scientific specialties outside their own fields. It is both a sign of
that last infirmity of noble minds, the ambition to play destiny on the world
stage, and of the completeness of the conquest by natural science when the
public takes scientists' answers to scientifically irrelevant queries, not as
opinions of interested citizens, passionate amateurs, but as sagacities that
are better than oracular utterances from Dodona 'because they must be
laboratory tested 99 and 44/100 percent pure.
How does all this apply to the honest and full expression of the creative
power? How can I find any fault with the creative achievements of natural
science? What I mean to arrive at .is this: we pay for everything we receive,
and just as much in hidden as in open ways. The scientist gives his blood,
sweat, and tears; the private foundations and the government agencies
appropriate funds; the universities allot what they can; the military services
participate wholeheartedly; the wives and children of many devoted scientists
make sacrifices too for the welfare of all; 'We all pay taxes and give moral
support. The productivity is therefore stupendous, and it is multiplying. And
make no mistake about it: we must regard this abundance of new knowledge
as great good fortune. One must be insatiable, therefore, to desire something
more.
But it is not more in volume that is sought; there appears to be a
need for due measure, just proportion, or, better, another dimension of
thought. Those avalanches of fact roaring down from a million mesas, that
breaker of molten lava boiling out of the global fissure, have a horizontality
of effect which we would do well to offset. We are, in other words, back
to the theme of possible limitations of the philosophy of science. And we
could not discuss a more important topic: national and world dominance
projecting out from scientific to technological to social and economic organization and government, hence to every aspect of every individual's life,
argues a monumental responsibility for science. JUSt as the mantle of world
leadership fell unsought upon America's shoulders, the similarly unsought
power of all-pervasive influence came to science.
In short, we now look through the window of science upon all that
Concerns man. Thus we see much in an intense light but we see it narrowly.
A?d there is danger as well as benefit in this view. What if, for example,
~Jen~e ta~es over philosophy with its left hand, absentmindedly, so to speak,
.u~ In dOIng so requires of philosophy operations that are neither scien~~ftCally nor philosophically sound? Then the scientist should be willing to
Isten to the philosopher in hope of learning how to discharge his onerous
World responsibility more ably.
Some might question whether science, having established itself as an
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unquestionable authority, is in a mood to listen. Introoucing this delicate
topic, I choose an illustration which, being drawn from the early 19th century,
is less likely to inflame anyone than a current issue would. Specifically, let
us take the process of organic evolution. Thinkers of the Greek classic period
had speculated about the theory. The early Christian fathers discussed the
possibility without apparent spiritual discomfort. Much later Malthus
theorized about something resembling the survival of the fittest in a wellremembered essay. Darwin's grandfather and others touched the theory
gingerly. But oddly, science, erecting a ceiling over its head, resisted efforts
of some scientists and left it to other persons-inspired amateurs, we might
call them-to usher in the era of belief in organic evolution.
Loren Eiseley (1960) links facts of 19th century thought in a surprising
association. In 1819, two score years before The Origin of SPecies appeared,
the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, lecturing on philosophy, referred to a
belief which "has become quite common even among Christian people, that
the human race arose from a state of savagery and then gradually from a
monkey came up through various states to be man." Coleridge discussed the
way in which the intellectual climate may hamper or limit a scientist's mental
explorations. He observed that "there appears to have existed a sort of secret
and tacit compact among the learned, not to pass beyond a certain limit in
speculative science. The privilege of free thought so highly extolled, has at
no time been held valid in actual practice, except within this limit." Despite
the growing body of evidence from paleontology and other subjects, despite
the fact that for millennia plant and animal breeders had made th(!m!;el,res ~.
agents of accelerated, directed evolution, botanists and biologists time
again came up almost to the theory of biological evolution and then,
Eiseley phrased it, shied away or circled around it. True, there were
and religious pressures which reinforced this lid on their thought; but SCl1enc:CII
organizations also exerted influences to prevent using the
proofs to sustain a breakthrough into general scientific acceptance of
idea. There was some pt:'rsecution of the pioneers by scientists as well
by religionists. In the end, as I said, enthusiastic amateurs such
Chambers and Charles Darwin himself paved the path to official
of the belief.

,.

,.

,.

I handle this topic of trammels with diffidence because
do not wish to be unjust. The ceilings to be discussed
in large measure phenomena of transition, of
Despite the condescension of past times which we
when we speak of our "sophisticated" instruments, we
not accommodated ourselves to the floods of new knoVl"edge, we have not integrated them into our traditions and ideals. They
come too rapidly and they require constantly altering perspectives. As far
facts are concerned, we suffer, not enjoy, an "economy of over-abundance.
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We cannot, as a culture, assimilate any considerable part of the data that
daily pour into our laps. We cannot pull them into anything like a coherent
fabric, at least not one that has human meaning. Higher civilization is, therefore, a spiritual dyspeptic or mental patient. Here is one excuse for the sick
art and literature I mentioned: the honest artist today inevitably reflects
some of the fragmentation, emotional instability, anxiety of our time. This
result might perhaps have been predicted for an age primarily engrossed
with exploration and analysis rather than with the shape of large things to
come. So why did I not let time take its course, since if we survive we should
eventually mature OUt of these growing pains of the mind? Why didn't I
choose that other, safer subject, Emergent Harmony? I might have done a
neat bit of time-serving by serving up a delectable hope of Man Harmonious,
man marching forward singing lustily, his chin up and his eyes alight with
a vision of a future paradise of peace and plenty for all.
But fate or some mischievous spirit has decreed that instead I must
exasperate you with what may sound like carping aspersions upon the quality
of contemporary thought, especially scientific thought.
One ceiling that seems worth discussing is the finality with which most
persons now regard our doom as individuals and as a species. It is true that
some late 19th century popularizers of organic evolution attempted to see
automatic progress implicit in the theory, and endeavored thus to reconcile
their hearers to the belief. But science adduced too many evidences of the
decline and extinction of species, substantiating a fear of the ultimate
oblivion of man and finally the end of the earth itself. As Eiseley (1960)
PUt it, "Since the first human eye saw a leaf in Devonian sandstone and a
puzzled finger reached to touch it, sadness has lain over the heart of man."
Probably the ferment over organic evolution in the 60's, 70's, and 80's was
a more significant spiritual cataclysm than the Reformation. For millions a
black curtain fell before man as person, as race. Archibald MacLeish's writings
are representative. In one of his early sonnets he pictures mankind as gazing
plaintively up to a heaven of "nothing, nothing, nothing at all." His late
?Detic drama J. B. offers little more promise of relief from the darkness of
mexplicable pain and ultimate oblivion, except for a flicker of inexplicable
h~man love here on earth. Most persons who read Teilhard's masterpiece of evolutionary synthesis, The Phenomenon of Man, feel exhilarated
until they reach the concluding chapters, which open a vista of spirimal
progression beyond the extinction of the race. Then, with Sir Julian Huxley,
who wrote an otherwise admiring introduction, many refuse to follow the
~Uth?r. !nto a mystical optimism which seems to hold little relevance or
redlblltty for this corporeal organization of cells, bones, and blood. Weare,
most persons tend to believe in their bleaker moods, standing in a dead-end
s~re~t staring at impenetrable walls, so far as hope of personal, spiritual continuity and meaning of existence are concerned.
In fairness, one must admit that these philosophical implications of
natural science do not seem to have impaired the predominantly optimistic,
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positive attitude of scientists toward life. On the other hand, the effects of
science's revelations upon general thought, especially upon current philosophic thought, are certainly not all to the same purpose.
The flatness of our matter-of-fact materialism and the sense of doom
for the species are, for example, fraught with peril. Call it what you will,
the Creative Power or a spontaneous religious impulse; but man cannot be
emotionally and spiritually, not even intellectually, fulfilled in the cold
impersonality and separation from personal involvement implied in scientific
objectivity. (Parenthetically, we may ask: Is there truth in C. P. Snow's
observation that a relatively high percentage of physical scientists have
become inflamed by Communism as a faith requiring fervid dedication?
an artificial atmosphere of chilly objectivity do they come to yearn for
hot-blooded cause?) As Philip Wheelwright (1962) has recently <:U.lp.l ..""'L.<:"'.
the discrediting of myths which metaphorically embody profound,
truths leads to a period of skepticism that is spiritually empty. Man is
long content with such a vacuum. Our skepticism may well, because of
absorption with natural science, be inevitable; but a violent reaction to
may ~ equally inevitable. Man's impulses toward creative idealism,
natural longing for belief, for a cause that melts the human granules and
fuses them together, can build up and explode. The hazard is that the
logical, "objective" world will suddenly ignite into fanaticism; not nec:ess,arl1.
religious in the old meaning of the word but passionately intense in lli:1'.lVll~
pride, tribal loyalties, and the religious idealism which still survives, that
physical humanitarianism. This is a lethal compound: it means a uvuv,.
stimulus to the zealot who persists in every man despite the persuasion
this is an age of clear-eyed, unemotional thought. And the fanaticism,
the rebirth of the Chosen People doctrine in pseudo-scientific forms, is
the worse when people imagine that they are not fanatical but are
judicial, and severe only as a surgeon must ·be severe, because scientific
and a humane future absolutely require the severity. In such substitutes
religious intensity, not less ferocious because they rise unrecognized for
they are, we face dangers of world-wide extent. We may even have pn ·~pn~
upon the prophesied era of inflammatory reaction in the Nazi ferocity
the Jews, which was to have been wreaked upon other creeds and races
Hider had won, and in the killing of Ukrainian millions for differing with
politico-religious system. For, if Sartre was correct, Marxist materialism
indeed a type of religion. Human sacrifice has, however, never been
trated on such a scale in the histories of older religions. One wonders
replacement of old-time religious persecution with modern
fanaticism costumed in the motley of 19th century physical science and
cal humanitarianism is an improvement.
1 __.:_. _
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ANOTHER danger which has come, not at the bidding of
science but as a concomitant of the growth of our predominantly scientific-technological culture, is distrust of the
mind, at least in its more subtle powers.
Did some of you stiffen as I said that: "Distrust of the
mind"? You may reply with reason, "But science does not
distrUSt the mind - it seeks only to make the operation of reason orderly,
systematic, free of error, to keep its product sound and true." I agree, and I
hasten to assure you that I do not charge science with constructing that ceiling
over our heads. The limitation, one of the large paradoxes of our era, is
not blamable to any profession or group or philosophy. It is one of those
noxious weeds which grow in a fertile soil beside good plants. Two principal
currents, among others, may have nourished it. One was the justifiable suspicion or aversion with which most sober minds regarded the worst excesses
of the romantic period which followed upon the 18th century Enlightenment.
At their most questionable these extravagances are represented by that
succession of writers from the Count de Sade, whose demonic works gave
us the word sadism, down to the Italian poet D'Annunzio and later diabolists.
Byron contributed something to the flow of diabolism. I mentioned him
because I do not wish you to think that these excesses were products of a
few pariahs of little or no influence. Oddly, there were few who warned
the reading public against the satanists and many who viewed them as not
only exciting but admirable literary personages, much as today the teenage
music public assumes that if a young singer sells a million records or stars
in a movie, he is a great artist and a great soul. Even among the more
wholesome romanticists there was a copious outpouring of Gothic horrors,
sentimental naturism, and downright anti-intellectualism. In the generations
when these florid pyrotechnics filled the popular sky, the spread of
pure science and of applied science for the burgeoning industrial revolution
caused a thought movement which has been, in the main, most salutary and
prodigiously productive. This was the phenomenal progress of laboratory
science. One may theorize that scientists, who are generally self-selected
for the advancement of knowledge and the furthering of human welfare,
were reacting powerfully against emotional exorbitancies ranging from the
diabolical current in literature to the ferocities of the French revolution.
Th~y were seeing with increasing clarity the need for protecting the mind
agaInst its tendencies toward unrestrained enthusiasm and hysteria, toward
speculation based on little or nothing, toward all the mental faults we have
grounds to fear in ourselves. They sought mental discipline in every way
they could. The laboratory as it developed became a sanctuary for the quest
of ~act and its verification. One should also add that the 19th century became
a tlme of widespread religious disillusionment. Physical science with its
con,cept of absolute rule by natural law and the dramatc exposition of bio~OglC~ evolution persuaded millions that they had been betrayed by religious
a1~luslons. let us not discuss the validity of this conviction; suffice to generlle that a great many turned their backs indignantly upon what they had
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believed religiously. All these factors - the raptures of sentimental pantheists, the spine-tingling novelties of the diabolists, the reaction against
religious orthodoxies - made religion synonymous with superstition or
falsehood for many, made the mind seem peculiarly susceptible to error
through passion and prejudice, linked intuition with discredited mysticism,
made imagination a pitfall, made the mind, in short, suspect. In such a time
of disenchantment, we fell under an opposite enchantment: empiricism.
Experimentation, with its necessary companion verification, and the swift
development of improved apparatus, all the tangible and intangible paraphernaliaassociated with the scientific method, unobtrusively transferred
the emphasis from the mind to scientific method and instrument. To our
list of words that made us contemptuous or uneasy we began to add "metaphysics," "speculation," "deductive reasoning," "intuition," "imagination,"
and "the subjective." When I say with Erich Heller that we fell under the
empiric spell, I do not mean to imply that empiricism was delusive in its
proper place. But men who imagined that they could shift their human
responsibility to laboratory methods and instruments, and could magically
transfer the virtues of empiricism to other spheres - without a corresponding transfer of the mental discipline demanded in empiricism - such
men could be deluded. Carried to an extreme by some, the cult of objectivity
placed stultifying limits upon the thought of the more timid or less imaginative researchers. It meant exclusion, so far as possible, of the UU"~J.l""L1V';, .
intuitive, speculative aspects of the mind and inclusion of only those
of objectivity which could be scrutinized in the laboratory. In other words,
meant depreciation of the importance of the mind and increased o;LLlpU.~','.
upon those aspects of tangible or material nature known to the
of the time. Materialism became, as Levi (1959) phrased it, a lo;ll~"JU,I.
"the subjectivity of those who are ashamed of their subjectivity."
I suspeCt that questions such as these are leaping into your minds
"What do you propose, a return to unbridled fancy, mysticism, baseless sO(~CU"
lation unchecked by experimentation? Don't you recognize the dangers
the subjective, and the security in laboratory verification?" You may
that I am taking some devious path toward reconverting you to faith
mysticism and the supernatural as embraced in other ages. I am not.
one thing, I am saying that scientists may subscribe to a formal code
.
process for public purposes; but in private they normally work as
individuals, brilliant, imaginative, fallible, erratic, but in the main
by the best of motives to express their creativity. Einstein admonished us
watch how theoretical physicists operate, not listen to what they say
do, for the two modes do not correspond. Many of our better sCl'eOllll....
confess that they are puzzled at the way in which some of their most
ing results come to them. Dr. Carroll King, who appeared here some
ago as an American Chemical Society visiting scientist, told me, "Some
my best results have come by lucky accidents which I can't account for."
scientists admit that they alternate, as Poincare did, between wise oa~;sh·ren.e5II1
and strenuous toil; between systematic research and the incubation of
-20-

1-

st
>r
>r
n,
le

o.

ft
l!

a-

le
ts
In

ly
d:h
ty

;i-

pretations in the rather unpredictable but occasionally fecund unconscious.
Why, then, if the more productive scientists use imagination .and possibly
subtler faculties to warm the cold processes of experimentation, logic, inductive reasoning, if they do not hesitate to speculate somewhat as did Greek
metaphysicians of old; if they use all the levels and powers of the mind
despite their protestations, why harass them with reproaches about a ceiling
on their thought? One answer is this: shaming the use of certain properties
of the mind can reduce their power. Dubious or fUrtive use is not free and
full use. Also there is always the danger that young prospective scientists may
take the restrictions seriously, and find themselves not only disciplined in
thought but hamstrung. One deleterious effect of what might be termed the
"lens-eye" view as contrasted with perception by the whole scientist, including the unfettered use of the creative imagination, is this: of.ten the scientist
comes to believe that there is a peculiar virtue in the narrow view, in an
intense preoccupation with a segment arbitrarily cut from nature and set apart
in the laboratory; and that there is a sanctity in not attempting to see beyond
the data painstakingly gleaned and verified in this artificial situation. There
is an almost religious faith that the products of these sharply cloven, zealously
safeguarded segmental efforts wll somehow spring together by themselves to
form a meaningful whole, or make a unity salutary for mankind. In "A
Cabin in the Gearing," Robert Frost wrote of
. . . the fond faith accumulated fact
Will of itself take fire and light the world up.
Learning has been a part of their religion.
The narrow view is the height of respectability on a certain plane of research.
But even verified data may be misleading when expanded from a restricted
base into a comprehensive interpretation.
A widely respected chemist of our faculty, Norman Bauer, who died
not long ago, confided in me that he was haunted by this doubt: how much
did he lose when he carved a slice out of nature and experimented with it in
the laboratory? What was missing, how much of the situation was artificial,
When he took it out of range of certain forces and influences in the natural
COntext? What subtle but possibly decisive factor did he exclude from his
scrupulously controlled experimentation? The fragment of reality thus found
and proved-how significant was it in a more comprehensive view of reality?
We must, it seems to me, return to a larger trUSt in the human mind if
We are to go on more often to the next stage beyond laboratory analysis. We
shall be much more likely to achieve that fusion of the fragments which
e se~ lying about us in often futile abundance. We may assist minds to do
for thIS age, with its unparalleled fruitfulness, what Darwin and Spencer did
?r. a past generation, and do it better. Although we must not jettison objectIVIty and any means of disciplining the turbulent mind, we cannot sacrifice
of the mind's strength if we are to have the interpretations we need
Or higher progress.

7
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BUT SCIENCE has a broader responsibility. Since it is universally admired and trusted; since the most fruitful results
are expected from it; since its methods are imitated, its
ideals taken as patterns for practice in other activities;
since it is in a genuine sense revered as the prophet and
revelator of our time, it should strive to thrust up through
a ceiling which exists only as a habit retained from an old illusion. The
reference is to the relic of belief that only the solid has reality. The notion
that only wood and stone, steel and cement, flesh and bone in their gross
visible structures are real, has been shattered in the laboratory yet it survives as a mendacious but tyrannical ghost. Here again, a reaction ~,'UHj'l1C '"
to that of the child who has just learned that Santa Claus does not exist
still potent. Because we are wary of the possible resurgence of any sUlper'sti·-1
tions and illusions, we reject anything that seems to smack of the "UfAoLUa.,-• •
ural and hence also of the imponderable and the spiritual. But I
proposing revival of theologies which you eschew. I am only
recognition of facts which we feel ashamed to use, or do not adcn()wJled2ell11
in our lives. May I risk offending your intelligence by citing some eXiunple4 1
which are familiar?
There is, first, the matter of morale. Between twO football teams
are equally matched in certain obvious factors, the difference in the score
a contest will be a result of chance and something we term morale for
of ,better terminology. Morale is an important element in the release
creative energy. It can make the difference betwen inertia and pr<XltlctJIl'j
action. I am fond of thinking of Florence, Italy, when a dogmatic ec()nC)IllI.
determinist (and there still are some left) argues with me. For a long
Florence was not a great commercial city; nor was it a gold-producing
therefore it could scarcely have been expected to become famous for
att of the goldsmith or for commercial banking. But it became both.
had no first-rate marble easily accessible; therefore it could hardly have
expected to produce superlative marble statues in numbers. But it did.
lacked virtually all the physical resources necessary for the fostering of
plastic atts; yet this relatively small town became the art capital of
Occident during the Renaissance. How was Florence able to triumph
physical inadequacies and the twO human pitfalls, "the fear of existing
the necessity of living"? After allowing something for the influences of
and princes, we must, I think, see that some intangible source of the
in the Florentine spirit made it wonderfully creative.
Here is a different type of illustration. A speaker for a minority
informed the congregation that each member of that sect was oUltnUllD!:Ie11
4,000 to one in the world's population. One faint-heatted hearer
himself pursued by a mob intent on clothing him in tar and feathers.
the speaker went on to point out that this ratio afforded a glorious
tunity for each member to become the leader of thousands.
alchemy or corrosive acid. The difference between a productive
and an unproductive one may well be that the first believes - a theory
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lending itself to laboratory tests and measurements - that what he is doing
is somehow worthwhile; and the other's energy may be vitiated by what
existential philosophers term his "confrontation with nothingness."

•

•

•

To SUMMARIZE: the collective achievement of the natural
and mathematical sciences is so splendid to help us understand the universe and conquer nature that we must constantly marvel at it thankfully. On the other hand, the
overwhelming dominance of science produces some effects
of a "one-party system," and a one-party system has marked
deficiences. The one party comes to feel a rightness and a sureness which
may not always be justified. The might of majority makes right, even over
the wisdom of far-sighted minorities. Admittedly, science has both diversity
and certain built-in safeguards which tend to protect it, and us the lay public.
Its standards for the quest of 'truth on some levels are most admirable.
Nevertheless, I feel, this power is not now balanced by other elements of
adequate strength. We have, in plain, an imbalance, a disproportion, a
lack of the due measure which sages have recognized as true wisdom. If
anyone disagrees with me, and declares that 'there is not an imbalance, I
must consider his disagreement as an evidence of what I have asserted :
that an overwhelming power is likely to regard itself as all-sufficient and is
not likely to regard opposing minorities or individuals as wise or wholesome. They belong to the vanquished, the discredited. It need not be
unduly sensitive to criticism or the imperatives of change. It finds itself,
moreover, thrust into positions and duties for which it was not fashioned.
To illustrate a danger of dominance, let me remind you of a most
seductive situation which confronts the young scientist or engineer: Customarily his education is more or less specialized, partly because professional
curricula are designed to make him a specialist and partly because his professional enthusiasm commonly makes him ignore or depreciate his opportunities to gain breadth. As many experts in the sciences and engineering
h~ve pointed out, the aspirant in those subjects customarily feels impatient
WIth anything but courses which directly advance him toward success in his
specialty. When his subject rates high in the market, he can sell his services
advantageously even if he himself may not be a bargain in a direct compariso~ of I. Q., research productivity, and femndity of resource with persons
~ralned in other subjects. He receives customarily a higher salary, often carry~g .with it possibilities of supplementary income from consultation fees or
Sl~ emoluments. He is made to feel that what he is doing is worthwhile,
P~actlCal, more related to reality than the activities of the young person in
t e humanities and the arts. By admiring laymen, over-awed by his apparent
lllastery Over the mysteries of nature, he is invested with a measure of
oracular infallibility which radiates ,beyond his own province. I am eager
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to pay all homage due science and technology; but uncritical adulation by
the multitude can subtly undermine the humility which science seeks to culti\Tate, not as an abstract virtue but as an essential to clear thinking.
Therefore it is reassuring - it should be reassuring to persons in both
the sciences and the arts - to see numbers of scientists turning to philosophy,
not for pat answers but for additional height of reach and breadth of synthesis to be gained, we would hope, through intimate acquaintance with the
best philosophic minds of past and present. We hope that few will, in
effect, say, "Give me no metaphysical nonsense, no vaporous speculations
planted firmly in midair. What I wish from you is, first, a course in logic
and, second, a course in the philosophy of science fashioned upon the criteria
of empiricism." This attitude degrades the philosopher to the status of a
Greek slave serving a Roman master late returned from the conquest of
barbarous tribes, serving not to free the higher faculties of the master's
mind but to keep his accounts and help him rear his children as a glorified
but submissive governess.
No branch of knowledge can, in my opinion, at once strike down and
swallow whole another branch of knowledge as our logical empiricist, quoted
earlier, indicated that science had done to philosophy. Even if he did not
mean precisely that, but meant that science no longer had need of traditional
philosophy, having evolved a clarity of vision, certainly of result, and precision of expression beyond the powers of philosophy, he should not, I
think, have chosen the phrases he used. For in effect they clamp bonds upon
the outward and upward growth of science itself. The philosophy of science
has, he indicated, leaped far ahead of the efforts of men who vainly strove
"to say the unsayable in pictures or verbose constructions of pseudo-logical
form. . . . There is nothing unsayable to which it must capitulate." I cannot believe he meant that dogmatic expression as it sounds, for every
creative scientist stands at the border of the unknown and hence the
unsayable. How far does it extend? What new phenomena does it encompass? How can he describe the elusive properties of it, when he is sure
they exist but he is able to isolate and measure, according to his man-made
symbols, only one or twO of them? What nomenclature will he adopt, when
he knows that he is naming only a facet and not all of the potencies in the
discovery? And here we come to an illustration of the fact that the SClenlt1st
work is creative rather than simply revelatory: In a new area of discovery
the scientist must construct, rather than merely uncover, ideas.
intellectual constructions are based necessarily on the one-sided views
the sharply delimited nature of his experimentation allows him. All
he does not know but senses in dim, troubled prophecy remains
except perhaps through the incandescence that shines through an
metaphor to reveal glimpses of the infinitely complex reality which no
made verbalization or man-made mathematical symbol can encompass.
Scientists and engineers sometimes, as I have mentioned
pride themselves upon a lucidity and precision of language which
think a humanist might well learn from them. I grant that we in the
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can be guilty of sloppy reasoning and expression. On the other hand, a tight,
hard precision about those things still undetermined, about the mysteries
still beyond us but dimly predicted in our laboratory strivings, especially
about wonderful complexes which we can only partly visualize - and only
clumsily represent in symbols - precision may be misleading or inaccurate.
Please do not misunderstand - precision is, of course, a necessity in certain
situations. But a succinct, precise definition is an intellectual construction;
it is not the thing defined; it is a SOrt of diagrammatic or schematic presentation in the -best symbolic language that a particular observer is master of at
the moment. It is a picture of the observer's view of that phenomenon: it is
an idea about the thing. And from all I can learn of the staggering complexity and potentiality in nature, it is always an incomplete idea of the
thing. The rest remains unsaid and, for short or long, unsayable. If this is
true of a highly specialized branch of natural science, how much more true
must it be of that subject which seeks to integrate bodies of fact (incomplete ideas, mind you) drawn from several specialties and to distill from
them some larger meanings?
At every stage of our development we have, obviously, topped a new
horizon. What has lain on the other side has required us to reorient ourselves, to abandon or modify some generalizations and invent new ones.
The discoveries and new syntheses demand new names or new content under
an old label. To insist that nothing is unsayable sounds like sheer bravado.
Worse, it suggests that we are satisfied with the precision and completeness
of our current language and other symbol systems. Surely it is obvious
that much of our linguistic and symbolic equipment has come down to us,
firmly embedded in habit and print, from eras much less advanced scientifically and technically than ours. What did Madame Curie know of microcuries? Did Roentgen know that so many roentgens make a lethal dose of
radiation? Surely, then, it seems obvious that, barring a global catastrophe
of some fundamental sort, this age will some time seem primitive in verbal
and other symbolic systems of expression. It is natural to view one's own
time as the zenith of culture and to smile at the clumsy expedients and the
~allucinations of yesteryear, as we laugh at the hats and coiffures and hemhnes of, say, the Depressing 20's and Depressed 30's. It is good that many
scientists know and act better than that, especially because of the massive
dominance of science, for such an assumption is naive and dangerous. As
Ortega (1956) put it, "Obstinately to insist on carrying on within the same
familiar horizon betrays weakness and a decline of vital energies." At any
rat~ it 'betrays a lack of vision, and is contrary to the inner spirit of science,
which is nothing if it does not inspire a constant and constantly broadening
Cuest. Science means systematic adventuring into the unknown. Aldous Huxey. (1962) defines science as "the reduction of the bewildering diversity of
unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol
~YSt~ms': invented by man, and points out that scientific observation is always
Ia VieWing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system ... "
n practice we are always enriching our symbol systems, partly as we add new
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facets and dimensions to old concepts and partly as we add new names,
new units of measurement, new terms for new dimensions. Scientists know
that our linguistic and symbolic apparatus is often unwieldy and inadequate;
therefore it would be wrDng to suggest to philosophy that the correspondence
between nature and our symbolic rendering of it is other than fragmentary
and prDvisional, with some aspects left undesignated because we knDw little
or nothing about them. It seems to me the scientist must be ambivalent:
he must be precise as possible about what he sees through his own empiric
keyhDle; but he must use his imagination, as the pDet and painter do, to
see the cone 'Of meaning widening beyond his symbols, and fading into the
unknown. In other words, unless he is merely gathering a few more data,
adding a few stones at the causeway's end, he must see that his proper
sphere of activity is this very unsayable, because fDrmless, area around and
behind the symbol. This is only tD recognize that the symbol itself is
ambivalent: it stands fDr the fragment of reality verified in the laboratory;
but it also must prDvisionally stand fDr what we do not know about the
object or phenomenon. If there are many scientists and technolDgists who,
despite the truth of these assertions which their own practice proves, cling
to the naive assumption that a symbol or a word has only one value, has
the precision which is possible 'Only through ignDrance 'Of certain properties (
or of impinging phenomena, or arbitrary exclusion of these phenomena, let
us hope they will relinquish the illusion.

•

•

•

may we also hope that science will go increasingly to
poetry and art, not in condescensiDn or levity for mere
relaxation or superficial embellishments upon the fringes
of life, but for release, Dr penetration of that ceiling which
our physical-technical-industrial culture has erected a cubit
above the heads of most of us. We should go tD the poet,
novelist, artist, musician - if these are worth going to at all - for aid in
freeing the creative imaginatiDn; for a vision of the fact that reality existS
on many planes, but is most helpful on the higher levels of human complexity where it is not less powerful for being intangible and immeasurable
We must recognize once again that great metaphor stands fDr insight beyond
verbalization in our rough-hewn language which, for all its richness, it
hampered by the barbarity of its origins and by the connotations which
encrust it; insights which can be glimpses of the reality which eludes the
empiricist in his laboratory. (I recommend Erich Heller for some of bit
precise metaphors - with which he symbolizes some unfathDmable - and
hence "unsayable" realities.)
AND

Perhaps we in the humanities and the arts cannot hope that maDf
scientists, except possibly social scientists and psychologists, will seek die
wealth we know to inhere in the best fruits of our activities, past asJ.
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current, until we more often reflect a conviction of the worthwhileness of
life. We too must recover our balance. The existential attitude appears, in
my opinion, to place entirely too much emphasis upon self, so that mortality,
the annihilation of self, appears to be the only problem worthy of man's
attention; and the confrontation with nothingness, with non-being, becomes
not a portal to freedom but too crushing a burden for the mind to bear.
The emphasis must shift to acknowledgment of self as a link in the
unbroken chain of process, of evolutionary unfoldment, and to acceptance
of the obligation which the mind owes to process, to society, if you prefer,
for those strengths which not only give it uniqueness and distinction but
the power to act.
The humanist can, therefore, go to the scientist and engineer to help
restore his feeling of responsibility, based on a sense of the value of life,
a sense of which he himself proves his possession in his solicitude for family
and friends but which has often weakened in literature and art today.
Both scientist and humanist could well seek the meaning that inheres
in such a project as Grand Coulee or Boulder: for poet and novelist, musician and painter, the lesson is that they possess immense potencies of mind
and spirit, a little because they are unique individuals and a great deal
because each is a reservoir into which many streams pour power; each is
indebted to society for the strength and richness of universal mind. It is
through society or this universal mind, furthermore, that they find the channels to convey their contributions -to mankind. The scientist and engineer
should endeavor to see in such a project the same lesson but also this: that
the first reality in the great dam and power plant was the vision of the
project in the minds of those initially responsible. That imaginative vision,
intangible as it was, takes rank as of primary importance, not merely in
chronology but as of the first order of reality.
And now we arrive at the crux of the matter. If we do not find significance in this, my paper falls into fragments and chaos. This if anything
will bind the parts together into a useful synthesis.
Critic and philosopher Sir Herbert Read (1960) modestly proposes this
thesis in the form of a question: Is it possible that life acquires meaning
only to the extent that man is creative? But he quotes with approval the
forthright declaration of Owen Barfield (1928) , also an English critic and
philosopher, to the effect that William Blake grasped the essential nature of
meaning, "For all meaning flows from the creative principle . .."
Meeting on the ground of a common creativity, the scientific and
humanistic cultures are not nearly so different as they often imagine themselves to be. They sometimes come together for mutual aid, and should do
SO more frequently. A symbol of their possible harmonious union is the
U. S. Science Pavilion which Minoru Yamasaki designed for the Seattle
World Fair. The scientific exhibits occupy suitably arranged quarters, some in
rectangular structures above ground, some in chambers below. But from a
~ntral COurt rise airy arches to dominate the entire building in height and
auty. These arches are not functional in a low sense; their function is a
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high one, to lift the spirit. There is a Romanesque strength in the roundness of the arches, but the soaring height of the pillars and the angularity
imparted by bracing members rising to a point at the top give suggestions
of Gothic aspiration. These arches symbolize the eternal eagerness of the
best minds, whether in science or the arts, to break through into areas
unmapped, unexplored. The introduction which Richard Eames wrote for
visitors to hear upon entering the Pavilion is relevant at this juncture:
"With a special kind of curiosity and a sense of elegance the scientist
uncovers hidden relationships. From these and others he builds intellectual
constructions . . .
"Science is essentially an artistic or philosophical enterprise, carried on
for its own sake. In this it is more akin to play than work But it is a quite
sophisticated play in which the scientist views nature as a system of interlocking puzzles. He assumes the puzzles have a solution, that they will be
fair .. . His motivation: fascination with the puzzle itself. His method: a
curious inter-play between experiment and idea. His pleasures are those
of any artist. High on the list of prerequisites for being a scientist is a
quality that defines the rich human being as much as it does the scientist: his
ability and his desire to reach out with his mind and his imagination to some·
thing outside himself."
Thus Eames wisely fused the two cultures together in spirit. Down
through the ages, the most sagacious and fruitful minds have always levied
upon both cultures. Let us then cease to speak of them as twO, for they
should be and properly are one. When we speak of the glories of one or
the other, we are not magnifying science or art, but the wonder of the mind
when it waxes strong upon the purest foods that the universe provides.
And both cultures may profit from a clearer vision of this principle: that
the real meaning of life lies not in some maxim of philosophy, or in a quotation from sacred writings, or in a line of great poetry, or in a formula
from science, but in the earnest and courageous exercise of the creative power.
In the creative process, a miracle can occur. If I may repeat a figure,
each person is a dam capable of impounding tributaries of power and
wisdom from all the earth, from all ages. Some of us are only small, earth·
fill dams, storing up hut giving little. All teachers transmit, as a dam stores
water and gives it up to farmers during the thirsty months. Researchersthe superior type - add something beyond the acquisition of data. And
some teachers and researchers not only store and transmit but transmute:
their spirit defies gravity; they turn the dull water, which by itself seeks
only lower levels, into divine fire which aspires to the higher planes. This
is what the responsible creator strives to do, it is what the capable and
inspired creator achieves. To be an honest, able creator is to find, each day,
more of life's meaning and to make it for the generations to come.
Man's potency, or rather his command of potencies in the sphere of
mind enveloping the physical earth, could be multiplied if we reunited the
two cultures, the scientific and the humanistic. The responsible exercise of
creativity requires that we strive to fuse these complementary resourCes.
-28-
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This effort we must make with persistence and perspicacity if we are to enter
fully into the next phase of evolution, that of a world society in which
emergent harmony takes the place of "survival of the fiercest." It is probably through such exercise of the creative power that we find life's meaning and the means of survival.
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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of the Utah State University,
in the words of its constitution, is
!.

a

To encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by
sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual faculty
lectures in the fields of (a) the biological and exact sciences, including
engineering, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural
Sciences, and (b) the humanities and social sciences, including education
and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture
in the Humanities.

The administration of the University is sympathetic with these aims
and shares the cost of publishing and distributing these lectures.
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty Association.
Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing lecturers are,
in the words of the constitution:
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) publication
of research through recognized channels in the fields of the proposed
lecture; ( 3 ) outstanding teaching over an extended period of years;
( 4) personal influence in developing the characters of students.

Dean Culmsee was selected by the committee to deliver the Faculty
Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members of the Association we are happy to present this paper: THE RESPONSIBLE EXERCISE OF CREATIVE POWER.
COMMITIEE ON FACULTY HONOR LECTURE
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